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CHAPTER 8 
What Drives Some Countries to Hoard Foreign Reserves? 
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Managing capital flows and liquidity demand has been a central issue for emerging-market 
countries.  In an era of global imbalances, rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by 
surplus countries is also an issue for the interntional system.  In a well-functioning international 
financial system there would be no advantage to holding large reserves so this raises the 
question of whether surplus countries have a deliberate strategy of building reserves and why 
they would do this.  This paper examines the motives for foreign reserve accumulation and 
analyzes the effects of financial development and capital flows on reserve accumulation in East 
Asian economies.  We present a model in which a state holds reserves to supply foreign 
exchange liquidity in underdeveloped financial markets.  Using annual data for 12 Asian 
economies between 1980 and 2009, our empirical results confirm the precautionary motives 
and financial stability motives in the region.  We also find that financial development attenuates 
central banks’ motivation to hoard reserves by reducing the impacts of capital flows on foreign 
reserve demand.  The policy implications are that improving financial market development 
within developing countries will reduce the incentive to build surpluses and accumulate 
reserves, while improving the international financial system to reduce volatility would also help.  
Keywords:  foreign reserves, capital flows, financial development 
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1
  Crawford School of Economics and Governance, the Australian National University.  Liversidge 
Street, Canberra ACT Australia, 0200.  Email: dyna.heng@anu.edu.au 
2
  The Australia-Japan Research Centre, Crawford School of Economics and Governance, College of 
Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University.  Email: Jenny.Corbett@anu.edu.au 
 170 
 
1.  Introduction 
The lack of a clear benchmark for the appropriate level of precautionary reserves, 
and for the appropriate use of reserves, is a problem, both at the country level and at 
global level.  
— Olivier Jeanne3 
Over the past two decades, East Asian economies have accumulated a large amount 
of foreign reserves.  The reserves in the region were merely US$0.7 trillion before the 
Asian crisis in 1997, but rose nine fold to about US$6 trillion in 2010.  This amount is 
more than half of total global foreign reserves.  
Four major motivations behind the rapid reserve build-up, as often suggested, are 
precautionary self-insurance against crisis (Aizenman and Lee, 2008), mercantilism to 
stimulate growth (Dooley et al., 2004), supporting the overall banking system and 
insuring against financial instability (Obstfeld et al., 2010), and managing exchange rate 
volatility (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2006).  These four rationales become even 
stronger amid increasing global capital flows, which are often volatile and potentially 
destabilizing.  Capital flows, for instance, increase output volatility (Mendoza and 
Terrones, 2008), cause real exchange rate appreciation and thus loss of competitiveness 
(Corden, 1993), and drive asset bubbles (Grenville, 2008).  
Reserve build-up, however, involves some types of domestic risks and costs (Pineau 
et al., 2006).  The most significant ones include inflationary pressure, asset bubbles, 
misallocation of domestic bank lending, complications in the management of monetary 
policies, sterilization costs, and potentially sizeable capital losses on central banks‘ 
balance sheets.  Conflict between reserve accumulation (that is, as a result of 
intervention in foreign exchange markets) and inappropriate increases in money supply, 
for instance, could cause inflation and asset price bubbles.  Sterilization costs—as 
another example—can be a considerable drain on a country‘s budget when the reserves 
are excessive (Rodrik, 2006).
4
 
                                                 
3  Jeane (2010).  
4  Sterilization cost is the spread between interest paid on external borrowing and the returns from 
investment of reserves.  For such costs, Rodrik (2006) provides an estimate of 1 percent of GDP when the 
reserve level is 30 percent of GDP. 
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To dampen macroeconomic effects associated with reserve accumulation and 
capital inflows, countries have applied various policies such as modest capital controls, 
sterilized foreign exchange intervention, and fiscal tightening.  As these policies have 
generally not proved to be effective in many cases, a satisfactory way of managing 
capital flows and reserve build-up remains to be discovered.  
In this paper, we hypothesize that the development of a deep and active financial 
sector attenuates the impact of capital flows on the demand for reserves.  Capital 
inflows influence reserve demand via their volatility, potential destabilizing effects, and 
the risks of sudden stop and reversal (Frankel, 2010; Jeanne, 2010; Kaminsky et al., 
2004).  Financial development, meanwhile, reduces the impacts of capital flows on real 
exchange rate appreciation (Saborowski 2009), and lowers output and macroeconomic 
volatility (Raddatz, 2006).  The main reason is that a well-functioning financial market 
enables efficient utilization of capital inflows, mobilizes resources, facilitates risk 
diversification, and provides access to global liquidity during shocks (Beck and Levine, 
2004; Beck et al., 1999; King and Levine, 1993). 
We present a model in which the state holds reserves in order to supply foreign 
exchange liquidity in underdeveloped financial markets.  Our theoretical argument is 
that with the low capacity of the private sector to meet liquidity demand when financial 
markets are underdeveloped, the state plays a role in supplying additional liquidity. 
Thus, in our model, the development of the financial system reduces the monetary 
authority‘s motivation to hoard reserves for liquidity provision.  
Using annual data for 12 East Asian economies between 1980 and 2009, we 
empirically examine the motives for foreign reserve accumulation and analyze the 
effects of capital flows and financial development on reserve demand.  Fixed effects and 
alternative measures of financial development are also introduced to check the 
robustness of the estimations.  We confirm the precautionary motives and financial 
stability motives for reserve demand in Asia.  Our results also consistently suggest that 
financial sector development reduces the impacts of capital flows on the demand for 
reserves.  
This paper contains three innovations.  First, our analysis concentrates on East 
Asian economies that attract a large share of global capital flows.  Second, we formally 
take into account the level of financial development in discussing foreign reserve 
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demand and capital flows.  Third, we introduce a ―rationalized‖ monetary policy 
reaction and the concept of private and public liquidity provision—first analyzed by 
Holmström and Tirole (1998)—into the framework set up by Obtsfeld et al. (2010).  
The next section describes the recent trends in foreign reserve accumulation among 
Asian emerging-market economies.  Section 3 provides a short review of the current 
state of understanding on foreign reserve accumulation and its nexus with capital flows 
and financial development.  Section 4 introduces the theoretical underpinnings of the 
analysis.  The formal model is presented in Appendix A.  Section 5 presents the 
empirical investigation.  Section 6 discusses the results.  Section 7 concludes and sheds 
some light on policy implications in reserve accumulation.  An appendix presents a 
model explaining the motives for reserve accumulation and the role of the private sector 
in liquidity provision.  
 
 
2.  Recent Trends in Foreign Reserve Accumulation Among Asian 
Economies 
 
As can be seen in Figure 1, there are three features in the trend of reserve 
accumulation over the past two decades.  First, reserves grew rapidly in 2002–07, at a 
pace three times more than that in 1999–2001.  Second, central banks in East Asia, 
particularly China, accounted for the bulk of the build-up.  Among the reserve 
accumulators, Asian economies are among the 10 largest reserve holders: China, Japan, 
Taiwan, Korea, India, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia.  The share of foreign 
reserves held by Asian economies increased from 45 percent in 1995 to 66 percent in 
2010.  Third, few monetary authorities held an increasingly larger share of the reserve 
holding.  China and Japan accounted for more than half the total world reserve 
accumulation. 
 
 
 
 173 
 
Figure 1.  Top-10 Reserve-Accumulating Economies: 1995–2010 (in US$ trillion) 
Top 10 Reserve-accumulating economies: 1995-2010
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Source:  Foreign exchange (series code:…1D.DZF), International Financial Statistics, IMF,   
  (accessed 19 December 2010); Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan).  
 
As shown in Figure 2, Hong Kong accumulates the highest percentage of reserves 
to GDP (121 percent), followed by Singapore (106 percent), Taiwan (94 percent), 
Malaysia (50 percent), and China (49 percent).  
As shown in Figures 3, 4 and 5, ratios of reserves to imports for many Asian 
economies are far above the traditional rule of thumb, which is three to four months‘ 
coverage.  Taiwan, for example, would be able to finance its imports for about two 
years with its reserves.  Similarly, as can be seen in Figure 6, China‘s ratio of reserves 
to short-term external debt reaches a value of about 10, which is much higher than 1, 
suggested by the Greenspan–Guidotti rule.  In addition, as shown in Figures 7 and 8, the 
reserves to broad money ratios in many Asian economies have increased significantly 
above the threshold values, which are suggested to be between 5 and 20 percent.  In 
Singapore, for example, the ratio is about 90 percent.  
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Figure 2.  Reserves/GDP in 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  International Financial Statistics, IMF.  GDP from World Economic Outlook, IMF, 
(accessed 23 December 2010); Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan).  
 
Figure 3.  Reserves to Imports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  World Development Indicators, World Bank (accessed 28 December 2010);                   
Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan).  
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Figure 4.  Reserves to Imports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  World Development Indicators, World Bank (accessed 28 December 2010); Central Bank  
   of the Republic of China (Taiwan).  
 
Figure 5.  Reserves to Imports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  World Development Indicators, World Bank (accessed 28 December 2010); Central Bank 
of the Republic of China (Taiwan).  
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Figure 6.  Reserves to Short-Term Debt (Greenspan–Guidotti Rule) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Authors‘ calculation; World Development Indicators, World Bank (accessed 28 December 
2010); Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan).  
 
Figure 7.  Reserves to M2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Authors‘ calculation; World Development Indicators, World Bank (accessed 28 December 
2010); Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan). 
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Figure 8.  Reserves to M8 
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  2010); Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan).  
Traditional indicators (see Box 1) for reserve adequacy suggest that in emerging 
Asian economies the stock of foreign reserves might be substantially in excess.  The 
unprecedented accumulation in several key Asian economies indicates that factors other 
than purely precautionary motives might be driving the rapid build-up of international 
reserves (Aizenman and Lee, 2008).  The evidence also suggests that limiting 
vulnerability has probably not been the primary motive for recent reserve build-ups in 
most economies.  Nonetheless, determining the optimal level of foreign reserves is not 
straightforward as it is subject to uncertainty and institutional factors such as the degree 
of capital mobility, financial liberalization, or the weakness of the domestic banking 
system.  Under financial globalization, the high volatility of capital flows complicates 
the conduct of monetary policy and exchange rate policy, and has impacts on an 
economy‘s ability—particularly those with underdeveloped financial markets—to deal 
with sudden capital inflows and outflows.  This environment indeed influences the 
desired stock of foreign reserves (see Box 2 for the case of South Korea during the 2008 
crisis). 
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Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001) argue that the old rule of thumb that reserves should be 
equivalent to three months of imports is obsolete and a new benchmark that takes into 
account capital flows is needed.  They argue that the new benchmark should consist of 
the sum of short-term debt (external drain) and an allowance for possible capital flight 
by domestic residents (internal drain), taking into account differences in country risk 
and the exchange rate regime.  
 
Box 1.  Traditional Indicators for Reserve Adequacy 
Ratio Value Notes 
Reserves to imports 
3 to 4 
This ratio represents the number of months for which an 
economy could support its current level of imports if all 
other revenues were to stop. As a rule of thumb, countries 
should hold foreign reserves in order to cover their imports 
for three to four months.  
Reserves to short-term 
external debt 
 
1 
This ratio, known as the Greenspan–Guidotti rule, reflects 
an economy‘s ability to service its existing short-term 
external debt (debt maturing within a year) in the case of a 
sharp deterioration in the external financing conditions. 
Typically, the country is prudent if the ratio is equal to 1 
(Garcia and Soto, 2006; Rodrik and Velasco, 1999).  
Reserves to broad money 
(M2) 
0.05 to 0.2 
This ratio reflects the potential for resident-based capital 
flight from the domestic currency because broad money 
indicates a country‘s exposure to the withdrawal of assets. 
If the ratio is close to zero, broad money largely exceeds 
foreign reserves. In the case of an exchange rate peg 
regime, the lower the ratio, the higher is the potential for 
capital flight in the event of negative money demand 
shocks. This ratio has indeed increased in most Asian 
economies since the 1997 Asian crisis (see Wijnholds and 
Kapteyn, 2001) 
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3.  Literature Review  
 
3.1.  Reserve Demand 
Three major theoretical explanations stand out in the literature on reserve demand: 
precautionary motives, mercantilist motives, and financial stability motives.  In the 
precautionary view, countries accumulate foreign reserves as self-insurance to avoid 
costly liquidation of long-term projects (Aizenman and Lee, 2008), and to smooth 
domestic absorption as a cushion against sudden stops in capital inflows (Jeanne and 
Rancière, 2006) when the economy is susceptible to sudden stops.  In addition, 
countries can use international reserves to smooth the impact of capital-flow volatility, 
to manage an adjustable-peg or managed-floating exchange rate regime (Frankel, 1983), 
and to stabilize output (Aizenman et al., 2004; Garcia and Soto, 2006; Jeanne and 
Ranciere, 2006).  Similarly, foreign reserves can be used to stabilize fiscal expenditure 
in countries with limited taxation capacity and sovereign risk, and limited access to the 
global capital market (Aizenman and Marion, 2004).  
In the mercantile view, reserve accumulation is the result of a growth strategy by 
keeping exchange rates undervalued to stimulate export growth and competitiveness 
(Dooley et al., 2004).  Moreover, foreign reserves can serve as ―collateral‖ for 
encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI).  Similarly, foreign reserve accumulation 
can occur in the aftermath of a growth strategy that combines export promotion and 
credit subsidization—known as ―financial mercantilism‖ (Aizenman and Lee, 2008). 
The development experience of East Asia suggests the prevalence of export promotion 
by preferential financing, which effectively subsidizes investment in targeted sectors 
(Aizenman and Lee, 2008).  The promotion was achieved in several ways, including 
through direct subsidies funded by state banks; by means of financial repression where 
favored sectors enjoyed preferential access to cheaper external debt; or through ‗moral 
suasion‘ where private banks were encouraged to provide favorable financing.  
In the financial stability view, a major motivation for central banks to hold foreign 
reserves is to support the overall banking system and to insure against financial 
instability (Obstfeld et al., 2010).  In this view, financial shock is not simply a ―sudden 
stop‖, in which case countries would need to hold reserves only in proportion to their 
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short-term external debt (Greenspan–Guidotti rule).  Given such motivation and the 
desire for exchange rate stability and vulnerability to portfolio shifts by domestic 
residents, the monetary authority needs to hold reserves proportional to the size of its 
banking system.  
 
3.2.  Capital Flows, Reserve Accumulation and Financial Development 
In this section, we connect the link among capital flows, reserve accumulation and 
financial development.  Despite the benefits of capital flows on investment and growth 
(Bosworth and Collins, 1999; Mileva, 2008; Mody and Murshid, 2005), capital flows 
can have a direct impact on macroeconomic stability and then affect reserve demand 
through at least three channels, as can be seen in Box 3.  
First, capital flows affect reserve demand through increased output volatility as they 
are more often pro-cyclical than countercyclical (Kaminsky et al., 2004; Mendoza and 
Terrones, 2008; Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008).  Sudden changes in the direction of 
capital flows, for instance, tend to induce or exacerbate boom–bust cycles in economies 
that lack a deep and well-functioning financial sector (Aghion et al., 2005).  This 
relation implies that increases in capital flows tend to increase output volatility, which 
motivates more precautionary demand for foreign reserves.  
Second, capital inflows influence reserve demand through their appreciation 
impacts on the real exchange rate and thus have negative effects on the external 
competiveness of recipient economies (Athukorala and Rajapatirana, 2003; Corden, 
1993).  As Asian economies are fearful of appreciation (Pontines and Yongqiang, 2010), 
central banks are induced to intervene in foreign exchange markets by buying reserves 
to ―lean against the wind‖ when there is upward pressure on exchange rates.  The 
reasons for such intervention could be that a fixed or relatively rigid exchange rate can 
provide benefits in terms of macroeconomic stability, particularly to developing 
countries where financial development is limited and the capital market is closed 
(Aghion et al., 2009).  On the contrary, real exchange rate volatility reduces growth in 
countries with relatively weak financial development (Aghion et al., 2009).  In such 
cases, reserve accumulation is a result of intervening in foreign exchange markets or 
stabilizing the real exchange rate in the presence of volatile terms-of-trade shocks and 
potentially destabilizing capital flows.  
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Third, capital inflows motivate reserve demand when they drive up equity and asset 
prices (Grenville, 2008; Schadler, 2008), reduce the quality of assets, and adversely 
affect the maturity and currency composition of the balance sheets of the private sector. 
This contributes to greater financial fragility, which increases the odds of a currency 
crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).  Real estate booms and asset price bubbles can 
amplify financial fragility and crisis risks, thus making the economy particularly 
vulnerable to financial shocks and crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).  In such cases, a 
reserve build-up can also be associated with growing fragility of a country‘s banking 
system because concerns about financial stability lead countries to hoard foreign 
reserves for liquidity provision to mitigate the possible transmission of a banking crisis 
to a currency crisis during shocks.  
Analysis of the three transmission types implies that the development of the 
financial sector can attenuate the reserve demand by weakening the impacts of capital 
flows on output volatility, the real exchange rate and financial fragility.  First, a more 
developed financial system is associated with lower output volatility across countries 
(Beck et al., 1999).  Second, a deep and active financial sector can provide broad 
investment opportunities, direct capital inflows towards their most productive use, 
mitigate investment demand constraints (Ötker-Robe et al., 2007), and thus reduce real 
exchange rate appreciation (Saborowski, 2009).  Third, financial development has a 
large causal effect in the reduction of macroeconomic volatility as a result of liquidity 
provision by the financial sector (Raddatz, 2006), which then requires less liquidity 
provision by the government. 
Different strands of the literature discussed above underline: i) the motivation to 
accumulate reserves; ii) the potentially adverse impacts of capital inflows on the 
recipient economies and thus on the reserve build-up; and iii) the importance of the 
financial market in mobilizing and allocating resources efficiently to attenuate the 
impacts.  These findings shape our hypothesis that the impacts of capital flows on 
reserve demand could be attenuated by the development of deep financial markets and 
institutions.  
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4.  Theoretical Motivation Based on Liquidity View 
 
The theoretical framework underpinning our analysis rests on three important 
strands of the literature: foreign reserve accumulation, liquidity provision and financial 
development.  We take into account the concept of liquidity in the model as it plays an 
essential role in the literature of financial crisis. Higher liquidity can significantly 
decrease countries‘ vulnerability to external shock in the face of weak domestic 
fundamentals (Mulder and Bussière, 1999).  Similarly, in the model of amplification 
mechanism of financial shock, liquidity provision by the central bank can alleviate the 
crisis (Krishnamurthy, 2010).  
Drawing on the work of Holmström and Tirole (1998), we introduce the concept of 
private versus public supply of liquidity (domestic versus international liquidity) into 
the framework in Obstfeld et al. (2010).  In the case of liquidity demand shock, 
domestic residents or firms can meet liquidity by issuing claims on their productive 
assets or by using a credit line (Holmström and Tirole, 1998).  When financial markets 
are not developed well enough to provide these options, however, the government might 
need to step in to supply additional liquidity.  The underdeveloped financial markets 
could be caused by collateral constraints (Caballero and Panageas, 2005).  In these 
circumstances, the build-up of foreign reserves is motivated by the government‘s role in 
supplying additional liquidity to domestic economic agents during a liquidity shock—
that is, a sudden stop or capital outflows, with the presence of an underdeveloped capital 
market that fails to fully meet liquidity demand.  This relation implies that the 
development of a deep and active financial market could bring about two benefits.  First, 
it could promote resource mobilization for more private liquidity provision.  Second, it 
can reduce the impacts of capital flows on macroeconomic and exchange rate volatility, 
and vulnerability to financial crisis.  These two benefits, therefore, can attenuate the 
state‘s motivation to hoard reserves. 
The theoretical reasoning outlined above motivates our simple modeling of the 
relationship between the demand for liquidity, the level of financial sector development 
and an economy‘s international reserve accumulation.  In the model outlined in the 
Appendix, we follow Obstfeld et al. (2010) in deriving the liquidity demand in a 
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domestic economy. Unlike the framework set out in Obtseld et al. (2010), however, in 
which the central bank sells foreign reserves passively, we introduce a monetary 
reaction function based on optimizing behavior to motivate its intervention. 
Furthermore, as noted earlier, our model also introduces concepts of private versus 
public liquidity provision and the level of capital market development.  
 
 
5.  Empirical Approach 
 
We turn to an empirical investigation on the liquidity demand, financial 
development and reserve accumulation.  Based on the theoretical motivation outlined in 
the previous section and Appendix A, the reduced form for our empirical study can be 
simplified as:   
 
     Re serves 1 2Capflowsit 3Findevit 4CapFinit 5Xit it it,  (12) 
where Reserves is the amount of foreign reserves, Capflows is capital inflows, Findev is 
financial development, and Capfin is the interaction terms between capital flows and 
financial development. Xit is a vector of control variables including GDP per capita, 
broad money, trade, exchange rate stability, and financial openness, which are often 
included in the literature.   is the fixed effect and ε is the error term.  We also include a 
dummy for the post–Asian crisis period, POST, in order to capture potential differences 
in reserve accumulation patterns across countries between the pre and post Asian crisis 
periods.  
The parameters of main interest are 3  and 4 , which capture the effects of 
financial development and the interaction of capital flows and financial development on 
reserve accumulation, respectively.  If financial development can attenuate the impact of 
capital flows on reserve accumulation then 4  should be negative and statistically 
significant.  Meanwhile, we expect the coefficient of capital flows, 2 , to be positive 
and that of financial development, 3 , to be negative.  
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For potential liquidity demand, we use broad money over GDP.  Using broad money as 
a proxy for possible liquidity demand is motivated by (Wijnholds and Kapteyn, 2001), 
the Early Warning System literature, and the financial stability model presented by 
Obstfeld et al. (2010).  Short-term external debt can also be a good proxy for liquidity 
demand.  Given data availability, however, broad money (M2) is preferred in this 
analysis.  
Financial development is a broad economic concept, within which there is a large 
literature on the measurement of financial development (see, for example, Beck et al., 
1999).  Among all measures, the sum of total external equity liability and debt liability 
is used as an indicator of a country‘s level of financial development in terms of access 
to external financial resources.  The measure of financial market development as the 
extent of external liabilities is based on the assumption that countries with less 
developed domestic financial markets also have fewer external liabilities.  Thus, this 
measure will be used for our main regressions and analysis.  Besides, the total stock 
value traded measures financial market liquidity while stock-market capitalization 
reflects the size and depth of the market.  These alternative measures will be used for a 
robustness check in the next section.  
For financial openness, the Chinn–Ito Index (2008) is used.  This index is based on 
the binary dummy variables that codify the restriction on cross-border financial 
transactions reported in the International Monetary Fund‘s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restriction (AREAER).  A higher value signals a higher 
degree of openness to financial transaction.  
For capital flows, we follow Mendoza (2010) by using the sum of the current 
account and net FDI inflows scaled by GDP.  This measure captures more of the short-
term component of capital flows (hot money)—considered to be volatile and potentially 
destabilizing in the literature.  A negative value indicates the level of short-term flows 
needed to finance a current account deficit.  A positive value might reflect a current 
account surplus and positive net FDI inflows.  This indicator could be construed as a 
possible inducement for appreciation pressure on the currency, in which there would be 
a positive link to reserve accumulation. 
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Our annual data sample covers 30 years from 1980 to 2009 and includes 12 Asian 
economies.
5
  (See Box 3 for an explanation of each variable and the Appendix for data 
sources.) 
 
Box 3.  List of Explanatory Variables for Reserve Build-Up 
Variables Sign Notes 
GDP per capita +/– GDP per capita can reflect the stage of economic development. It is expected to 
be positively/negatively linked to reserve accumulation according to the stage of 
the economy.  
Capital flows 
(Hot money) 
+ A potential indicator of hot money flows to a country is the sum of the current 
account and net FDI inflows scaled by GDP. A negative value indicates the level 
of short-term flows needed to finance a current account deficit. A positive value 
might reflect a current account surplus and positive net FDI inflows. This 
indicator could be construed as a possible inducement for appreciation pressure 
on the currency, in which there would be a positive link to reserve accumulation.  
Broad money + Broad money often indicates a country‘s exposure to the withdrawal of assets or 
resident-based capital flight from the domestic currency. Thus, it is used as a 
proxy for potential liquidity demand. Broad money is expected to be positively 
linked to reserve accumulation.  
Trade + Trade openness might require foreign reserve demand for transaction. Also, a 
conventional rule of thumb suggests that a country should hold reserves enough 
to finance three or four months of imports without income flows. For this reason, 
as a precautionary demand, a country can hold more for self-insurance. Thus, 
imports/GDP is expected to be positively linked to reserve accumulation (source: 
WDI, the World Bank). 
Financial development – A high level of financial sector development could mobilize resources more 
efficiently and would be less vulnerable to crises. Thus, it is expected to reduce 
demand for a reserve build-up. A country‘s total equity and debt liability is used 
as an indicator of capital market development and as a proxy for the country‘s 
access to the international financial market.  
Interaction term 
(Capital flows* 
financial development) 
– The interaction term captures the marginal effect of capital flows on reserve 
demand. It is expected to take a negative sign given the hypothesis that increases 
in financial development could help attenuate the impact of capital flows on 
reserve demand.  
Financial openness  
(Chinn–Ito) 
+ We adopt the Chinn–Ito Index. Higher financial openness suggests vulnerability 
to external financial shocks, and is expected to increase precautionary demand 
for reserves.  
Exchange rate 
fluctuation 
+/– On the one hand, exchange rate fluctuation within a certain range would result in 
less government intervention in the foreign exchange market, thus less reserve 
build-up. On the other hand, greater real exchange rate volatility is empirically 
linked to lower growth and financial instability—notably, in financially 
underdeveloped countries. Also, a higher level of reserves is empirically linked to 
reduced exchange rate volatility (Hviding et al., 2004). This variable is expected 
to be positively linked to reserve holding.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5
  China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Thailand and Vietnam. 
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6.  Regression Results and Analysis 
 
Table 1 reports the results of regressions with a log of reserve accumulation over 
GDP as the dependent variable.  Column 1 shows the result of regression with a country 
fixed effect while column 2 includes country and year fixed effect. In columns 3 and 4, 
we add capital flows, financial development and the interaction terms with country fixed 
effect and country and year fixed effect, respectively.  
We observe that broad money and trade are positive and significant in all 
regressions while the post-crisis period is positive and significant in columns 1 and 3 
(country fixed effect).  These results confirm the precautionary motives and financial 
stability motives for reserve accumulation among Asian economies. Based on the results, 
a 10 percent increase in broad money over GDP leads to about a 5 percent increase in 
reserves over GDP.  Similarly, when trade over GDP increases by 10 percent, the 
reserves over GDP ratio would increase by about 7 percent.  
In columns 3 and 4, we find that the coefficient of capital flows is positive and 
significant.  This finding implies that a 10 percentage point increase in the capital flows 
ratio would lead to about a 26 percent increase in the reserves-to-GDP ratio.  This effect 
is fairly high, but is evidenced by some Asian economies‘ behavior.  In our sample, an 
average capital inflow is 4 percent while the average increase in reserves-to-GDP ratio 
is 14 percentage points.  
We also find that the interaction terms between capital flows and financial 
development have the expected sign and are significant.  The results confirm our 
hypothesis that financial development attenuates the impacts of capital flows on reserve 
accumulation.  The implication here is that although capital inflows could motivate 
reserve accumulation, a well-functioning financial system could help reduce the impacts 
of capital flows on reserve hoarding.  In other words, the magnitude of the impacts of 
capital flows on reserve demand decreases with a higher level of financial development 
due to the efficient absorption of capital inflows.  
More interestingly, if financial development increases by 10 percentage points, the 
impact of capital flows on reserve demand will be reduced by 11 percent.  Based on the 
results of our empirical analysis, we can also determine the threshold level of financial 
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development around which the effects of capital flows on reserve accumulation are 
neutralized.  To do this, we differentiate the model in equation 10 (in column 4) with 
respect to capital flows. 
 
         
 
The threshold level of financial development is about 2.6, which is equivalent to 
260 percent of GDP in terms of access to international financial resources.  This is 
indeed a high level of financial development.  In our data, only Hong Kong and 
Singapore have such financial size and depth.  Nonetheless, the threshold itself is not 
important. Rather, an essential implication is that the high level of financial sector 
development attenuates the impacts of capital flows on reserve accumulation.  
 
6.1.  Robustness Check 
To conduct a robustness check, we use domestic credit and market capitalization 
over GDP (DCMCAP) and domestic market liquidity (total stock value traded over 
GDP, SVT) as alternative proxies of financial development and resource mobilization 
for liquidity provision by the private sector.  The results are presented in Table 2.  We 
observe that the results are not quantitatively much different from our earlier findings. 
The coefficients of broad money, trade and the post–Asian crisis period dummy remain 
positive and significant.  The interaction terms between capital flows and financial 
development are all negative and remain statistically significant.  The results confirm 
our hypothesis that financial development attenuates the impact of capital flows on 
reserve accumulation.  Based on the results, a 10 percent increase in financial 
development reduces the impacts of capital flows on reserve accumulation by between 6 
and 10 percent. 
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7.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined the motives for foreign reserve accumulation and analyzed 
the effects of capital flows and financial development on reserve demand in the Asian 
region.  We have presented a model in which a state holds reserves to supply foreign 
exchange liquidity in underdeveloped financial markets.  Our theoretical argument is 
that with the low capacity of the private sector to meet liquidity demand due to 
underdeveloped financial markets, the state plays a role in supplying additional liquidity. 
Thus, in our model, the development of the financial system weakens the monetary 
authority‘s motivation to hoard reserves for liquidity provision. 
Using annual data for 12 East Asian economies between 1980 and 2009, our results 
confirm the presence of a precautionary motive and a financial stability motive in 
hoarding reserves.  By using various measures of financial development, we also 
consistently found that financial sector development reduces the impacts of capital 
flows on reserve demand.  
 
Table 1.  Regression Result with log(Foreign Reserves/GDP) as Dependent 
Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
logGDPPC 0.153 –0.099 0.175 –0.1 
 (0.12) (0.053)* (0.10) (0.042)** 
logM2 0.542 0.485 0.528 0.427 
 (0.242)** (0.162)** (0.210)** (0.126)*** 
lnTrade 0.73 0.758 0.683 0.774 
 (0.239)** (0.110)*** (0.217)*** (0.128)*** 
Evol –1.604 –3.631 –1.446 –3.979 
 (1.03) (2.21) (1.14) (2.29) 
Kaopen 0.137 0.022 0.19 0.04 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.081)** (0.05) 
Post crisis 0.469  0.471  
 (0.237)*  (0.217)*  
Capital inflows   2.057 2.721 
   (1.091)* (1.009)** 
Financial development   –0.009 –0.08 
   (0.06) (0.06) 
Cap*Fin   –1.094 –1.044 
   (0.361)** (0.298)*** 
Observations 326 327 322 322 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.9 0.85 0.91 0.87 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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           Financial Development 1 (Fin.Dev1) is the sum of total external equity liability and debt 
liability.  
Table 2. Robustness Check with Access to International Market (External Access) 
 (1) (2) 
logGDPPC –0.114 –0.126 
 (0.036)*** (0.048)** 
logM2 0.633 0.505 
 (0.238)** (0.172)** 
lnTrade 0.683 0.636 
 (0.084)*** (0.091)*** 
Evol –4.506 –4.089 
 (2.328)* (2.34) 
Kaopen 0.00 –0.02 
 (0.04) (0.05) 
Capital inflows 2.523 1.79 
 (0.692)*** (0.668)** 
DCMCAP –0.051  
 (0.09)  
Cap*DCMCAP –0.59  
 (0.214)**  
SVT  0.186 
  (0.100)* 
Cap*SVT  –0.989 
  (0.331)** 
Observations 242 247 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.88 0.87 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
DCMCAP is domestic credit and market capitalization over GDP while SVT is total stock value trade 
over GDP.  
 
It is widely believed that a deep financial sector helps allocate resources efficiently. 
In extending this concept to precautionary reserve holdings to provide liquidity 
provision against shock, an important implication is that financial development could 
help reduce reserve demand due to capital flows and their macroeconomic consequences.  
Our finding in this paper suggests that an important part of a long-term policy in dealing 
with capital flows is the development of a deep and active financial sector.  Also, as 
capital flows can be volatile and potentially have destabilizing effects on 
macroeconomic management, the policy recommendation in favor of financial sector 
development becomes even stronger.  
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Appendix A.  The Analytical Model of Reserve Demand 
 
A.1.  The Private Sector  
The economy in the model consists of two typical periods: t and t+1.  The exchange 
rate on date t+1 is expressed as follows: 
 
                 
  )(1 eet ,  (1)  
where e is the foreign currency price of the domestic currency, and θ reflects the future 
state of the economy.  Higher values of θ indicate more favorable states of the economy. 
Economic agents in the domestic economy have divergent views of the fundamental that 
will materialize in period t+1. For a given θ, agents i expect that the fundamental will be 
θ+ε, where the noise, 
i , is uniformly distributed over the interval ],[   and 
0 i . i Є [0, 1] indexes domestic agents who are all risk neutral. 
Assume that there is a liquidity shock—in other words, a sudden stop or capital 
flow reversal—which increases the demand for foreign currency and, for simplicity, that 
foreigners are not willing to hold the home currency at any price.  In this case, the 
exchange rate will be determined by the exchange market involving only domestic 
residents, domestic financial institutions and the home monetary authority.  We also 
assume that the monetary authority can prevent domestic interest rates from fully 
offsetting expected exchange rate changes, or that the increase in interest rate per se is 
so damaging to financial stability that home residents discount it.  Transaction costs and 
interest gains that could potentially be earned from the currency position are ignored for 
simplicity here.  In such circumstances, people fundamentally care about the exchange 
rate in period t+1, compared with the exchange rate in period t. If θ is very low and the 
economic consequence from a liquidity shock is expected to continue when the financial 
market cannot function to fully offset the liquidity demand then the average market 
forecast is for continuing home currency weakness.  Domestic agents, however, hold 
divergent views on how weak the currency will be. 
Assume that domestic agents hold a domestic liquid asset (that is, a bank deposit), 
the size of which is proportional to total liquid asset lt at period t claimed by all 
domestic agents, and which can be sold for foreign exchange.  Banks‘ asset, however, 
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are illiquid.  Thus, if domestic agents liquidate their liquid asset, financial institutions 
can repay domestic residents only if they can mobilize resources domestically or 
internationally to fully meet liquidity demands or the domestic monetary authority 
intervenes to supply additional liquidity.  
Given the assumptions, domestic agent i would trade the home currency for foreign 
exchange if the home currency is expected to fall from its current level, or  
              tiitt
eeE  )()}/({ 1  . (2) 
For a given date, t, and exchange rate, et, the measure of agents such that  
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Therefore, at date t, the demand for foreign exchange in terms of the home currency as a 
result of liquidity demand shock is 
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2
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l   (4) 
where 
d
tl  is the total demand for foreign exchange liquidity.  
A.2.  Private Liquidity Supply 
From here, we depart from Obstfeld‘s framework by introducing private liquidity 
supply.  The financial institutions will coordinate to supply liquidity, the amount of 
which depends on the capacity of the financial sector to mobilize resources domestically 
or internationally to meet the liquidity demand.  In this regard, the net liquidity demand 
is 
  
           
,st
d
t ll    (5) 
where 
s
tl is the liquidity supply coordinated by all private financial institutions. If  t, 
for which 10    captures the level of the financial sector‘s ability to coordinate 
liquidity supply, 
d
tt
s
t ll  . Equation 5 can be rewritten as: 
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Equation 6 implies that the level of financial development partly determines the net 
liquidity demand. Higher capacity to coordinate resources for liquidity supply would 
help offset the liquidity demand.  
 
A.3.  Public Liquidity Provision and Central Banks’ Reaction Function 
The central bank is assumed to intervene in the foreign exchange market to 
minimize the following intertemporal criterion: 
                                    
where  is the discount factor and  is the loss function at period t.  In specifying the 
function, we follow Surico (2008) and specifically Srinivasan et al. (2009) whose 
function captures the asymmetric preference on exchange rate stability.  This is 
supported by the argument that emerging economies ―fear floating‖ (see, for example, 
Calvo Guillermo and Reinhart, 2002).  Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2006) 
conjectured that exchange rate policy has evolved towards an apparent ―fear of floating 
in reverse‖ or ―fear of appreciation‖ whereby interventions have been aimed at limiting 
appreciation rather than depreciations.  Pontines and Rajan (2011) confirm the existence 
of the asymmetry in central bank foreign exchange intervention responses to currency 
appreciation versus depreciation in India, Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Indonesia. In this regard, the monetary reaction function is: 
                (7) 
where  is the relative weight and  is the asymmetric preference parameter on 
exchange rate stability.  Here,  and  are the optimal level of foreign reserves and 
the target exchange rate, respectively.  We express the reaction function in period t+1 
because we will later assume that the exchange rate at period t is the central bank‘s 
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target rate.  The loss function departs from the standard quadratic form in that 
policymakers are allowed to treat differently the rate of appreciating and depreciating 
pressure.  It should be noticed that if γ = 0, the loss function becomes symmetric.  If γ > 
0, equation 13 implies that the rate of appreciation is weighted more heavily than the 
rate of depreciation.  In other words, if , the exchange rate appreciation would increase 
the policymaker‘s loss.  
 
        
Furthermore, since we take into account the central bank‘s motives for foreign exchange 
market intervention, it is assumed that the exchange rate depreciation/appreciation can 
be reduced by the central bank‘s intervention. That is,  
                ,       (8) 
where  and  are the error terms with zero mean and variance . 
Minimizing equation 7 subject to equation 8 leads to the following intervention reaction 
function of the central bank: 
   (9) 
Suppose that a central bank‘s optimal level of reserves is equal to the net 
liquidity demand in period t as expressed in equation 6.  In other words, given the 
economic fundamentals and with the underdeveloped financial market, the central bank 
would hold the necessary precautionary reserves to supply additional liquidity by selling 
R in foreign reserves, which is measured in foreign currency.  Indeed, for emerging 
economies with a thin domestic bond market and shallow financial system, there might 
be no practical short-run means of managing the exchange rate other than reserve sales. 
The optimal level of reserves for the economy‘s central bank in period t is then given by 
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Also, we assume that exchange rate at period t is the target exchange rate aimed for by 
the central bank—that is, .  Thus, equation 15 can be transformed as the 
following: 
              (11) 
Equation 11 indicates that the reserve accumulation is influenced by the expected 
liquidity demand, the fundamentals of the economy, the central bank‘s target exchange 
rate, its preference on exchange rate fluctuation, and the level of financial development. 
If the capacity of the financial market is high (high value of λ) then pressure on the 
currency would be smaller (small net liquidity demand), which requires less 
intervention by the government.  Equation 11 could also partly explain why reserve 
levels in countries with preference on exchange rate stability can be rather high.  
Suppose there is a bad realization of  , which causes a liquidity shock, and 
therefore pressure on the home currency as people liquidate their assets to speculate in 
foreign exchange.  With the underdeveloped financial market, which cannot fully 
coordinate to meet the full liquidity demand, the monetary authority will then exercise 
its ‗lender of last resort‘ role by using its reserves to moderate the exchange rate fall. 
This is motivated by the central bank‘s desire to limit exchange rate volatility and to 
avoid a currency crisis.  Nevertheless, with a huge liquidity demand shock, the pressure 
on the exchange rate will be greater and will require a bigger intervention if the 
economy‘s financial development is low.  
Similarly, suppose there is upward pressure on the exchange rate as a result of 
capital inflows.  The monetary authority with a preference on exchange rate stability 
would intervene by buying foreign currency and end up with reserve accumulation.  If 
the financial sector is developed enough to efficiently allocate resources to productive 
investment rather than consumption, or to efficiently intermediate capital outflows to 
offset inflows, the intervention in the foreign exchange market by the central bank is 
less necessary.  Less intervention should partly reduce the central bank‘s motivation to 
hoard reserves.  
The model provides implications not only for the central bank‘s liquidity provision, 
but also for the active management of liquidity by the central bank that values 
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macroeconomic and financial stability.  Put simply, the role of states in easing 
illiquidity and providing liquidity increases when financial markets are underdeveloped 
and cannot fully guarantee liquidity during shocks.  In other words, an open economy 
with less developed financial markets is expected to accumulate more reserves to ensure 
liquidity while limiting exchange rate and macroeconomic volatility.  This implies that 
the motivation to hoard reserves could be mitigated partly by developing a deep 
financial sector.  This theoretical framework provides the basis for the following 
empirical investigation.  
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Appendix B  
B.1.  List of Economies in the Sample 
China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam. 
 
Table B.1.  List of Variables, Definition and Data Source 
Variables Definition Source 
Log(GDPPC) GDP per capita World Development Indicators 
Log(M2/GDP) M2 over GDP World Development Indicators 
Log(trade/GDP) Export plus import over GDP World Development Indicators 
Exchange rate 
volatility 
Annual standard deviation of monthly change 
in exchange rate 
Authors‘ calculation based on exchange 
rates from IFS, IMF. 
Capital inflows 
(Hot money) 
The sum of current account and net FDI 
inflows over GDP 
Calculation based on data from IFS, IMF. 
Financial 
development  
Total equity liability plus total debt liability 
over GDP 
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). 
Updated until 2009 
DCMCAP 
Domestic credit and market capitalization over 
GDP 
World Development Indicators 
SVT Total stock value traded over GDP World Development Indicators 
Financial openness Chinn–Ito index (2008) 
http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-
Ito_website.htm 
 
 
Table B.2.  Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. 
Log(Reserves/GDP) 334 2.673 1.150 –0.724 4.799 
logGDPPC 359 7.914 1.574 4.576 10.645 
Log(M2/GDP) 339 4.302 0.670 2.065 5.490 
Log(Trade/GDP) 353 4.336 0.882 2.514 6.082 
FX volatility 359 0.025 0.070 0.000 0.835 
Financial openness 355 0.691 1.605 –1.844 2.478 
Capital inflows 358 0.051 0.095 –0.086 0.469 
Financial development 340 0.775 0.975 0.000 5.299 
DCMCAP 242 2.099 1.346 0.289 7.416 
SVT 252 0.623 0.868 0.000 7.558 
 
